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THE STRATEGIC VISION OF ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE

BY

COMMANDER CRAIG D. LESHER  
United States Navy

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**Commander Craig D. Lesher**  
**United States Navy**

**Colonel John Brinsfield**  
**Project Advisor**

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**U. S. Army War College**  
**Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The transition from tactical expert to senior leader involves widening one's scope and becoming comfortable at the strategic level. Strategic vision is one of the competencies required of the leader functioning at that level. This report develops a list of questions by which one can evaluate the senior leader's strategic vision and then applies the list to a study of the strategic vision of Admiral Arleigh Burke, United States Navy. The final determination of the evaluation of Burke's actions as Chief of Naval Operations revealed that he possessed strategic vision.



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"He developed his numerous [gifts] by...persistent application with...determination."

A contemporary of Arleigh Burke

### I. INTRODUCTION

As the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) reviewed the research just handed him by his Executive Assistant, he thought, "So this is the paper all my deputies are talking about...hmmm... by Captain Arleigh Burke. Good old '31-knot' Burke. Now, there's a hard working officer...pretty smart, too...for a 'black shoe.'" As he read he remarked out loud to no one but himself, "Wow, this is good stuff! Where did Burke get this? This paper lays out exactly what the Navy's vision should be for the next ten to twenty years at least." He continued talking to himself but less audibly now, "I knew Arleigh was a remarkable officer with a strong technical background. 'Pete' Mitscher told me Arleigh is the Navy's best tactician today. I need to make sure we groom him for CNO and find out more about how he developed his strategic visioning skills. In the meantime..." he trailed off as he wrote on the cover, "Forward to CJCS."

The CNO might have had thoughts similar to these as he read Captain Arleigh Burke's paper. The paper was a special project of Burke's as a member of the Navy's General Board. Burke eventually was promoted directly from the rank of Rear Admiral to be assigned the position of CNO during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the significant decisions and actions of Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as a basis for evaluating his strategic vision. The thesis is that the Admiral possessed an extraordinary ability to develop a strategic vision of critical importance to the nation.

The proof of the thesis will be approached in four steps. First (section II), a list of questions compiled by the author will be provided that will later be used to as a tool for measuring Burke's strategic vision. Second (section III), there will be an overview of the major events which provide the background for Burke's development from farm boy to CNO. Lessons from this section may be applicable to those who desire to develop their own vision skills. Third (section IV), will present the significant decisions and actions taken as CNO which are to be evaluated as evidence of strategic vision in the next section. Fourth (section V), the evidence of the previous two sections will be used to determine the validity of the thesis.

## ***II. WHAT IS STRATEGIC VISION?***

In this paper, there is a constant, parallel comparison of Burke's decisions and actions with the definition of strategic vision. Strategic vision is defined by the US Army War College as holding "a descriptive picture or image of a desirable future endstate which establishes or reinforces values, creates commitment and helps motivate action."<sup>1</sup> The model chosen as an evaluation tool is a combination of the concepts of vision as defined by a survey of general officers as well as the views found in today's corporate world. The information found in this

study was then condensed down and framed as questions to be used as a tool by which a leader's strategic vision may be evaluated. The list of questions follows.

*Did the leader imagine a preferred future and can it be described?*

*What did he do to create it?*

*Did he adapt the organization for a future environment?*

*Did the leader articulate the desired endstate and did he influence his followers?*

*How well does he lead his organization in achieving the desired endstate in terms of preparedness?*<sup>2</sup>

*Was the leader committed to his vision?*

*Did he determine a future place to go and how is that place described?*

*How did the leader envision his organization?*

*Was the leader focused?*

*Did he set priorities?*

*Was the vision the right scope?*

*Did the leader's vision reflect values worthy of the leader and his organization?*

*Did he spend time and energy developing his vision?*

In section five, Arleigh Burke's will be placed in the above questions where "he" or "the leader" is found. The information primarily in section five will be used to form the answers.

### **III. BURKE'S VISIONARY DEVELOPMENT: FROM FARM BOY TO NAVAL EXPERT**

Arleigh Burke was born on a farm near Boulder, Colorado in 1901 of hard-working parents. He entered the US Naval Academy in 1920.

The Academy of the 20s built its teaching on the study of naval history. This was the basis for strategy, tactics and international law and character and conduct. The ethic of hard work and education that Oscar Burke helped build in his son was a suitable foundation for the academy's principles of tradition, character-building and training.

Burke took full advantage of the opportunities the academy and the interwar Navy afforded him. According to one of Burke's biographers, he "was able to incorporate to a remarkable degree the traditional loyalty, technical imagination, and administrative ability that the navy desired to develop in its officers."<sup>3</sup> As a young naval officer, Burke established himself as an expert in naval gunnery. Burke thought he was only a "good average naval officer," but his achievements led one of his fellow officers to comment, "He may have been endowed with gifts beyond other men, but that is not important, for he developed the numerous ones he had to a superb degree by continuous, persistent

application with a firm determination to do anything he did very well."<sup>4</sup>

His efforts as a gunnery officer gained him the opportunity to pursue a degree in Science and Engineering.<sup>5</sup> From there he was assigned to the Bureau of Ordnance where he developed the technical expertise and research skills he found so valuable during the latter phase of his career.

After his job at the Bureau, Commander Burke managed to gain command of a destroyer in the Pacific War at just the right time. He took command of a destroyer in the Solomons where he made his reputation as "31-knot Burke." The ramp-up phase of the Pacific war allowed non-carrier forces the opportunity to gain naval victories. When "Bull" Halsey ordered "all South Pacific Forces [to] 'Keep pushing the Japs around,'" Burke got his first chance to see action.

One of Burke's memorable lessons from the Pacific war was gained in a nighttime engagement. Burke's radar operator reported a contact but Burke hesitated. "Are you sure it's a ship -- not just a rock? We've got to be dead certain, you know." Burke still hesitated and fired five torpedoes just before the cruisers he was supporting opened fire. After the smoke cleared, it was discovered that enemy destroyers had been

sunk and the U.S. naval force was unscratched. Burke, however, was disappointed in his overly cautious decision-making. He knew he could have destroyed the enemy without the cruisers resorting to gunfire which compromised their position. He decided that in the future he would trust his juniors and not delay taking action.<sup>6</sup> He recalled this experience when he asked a young Officer-of-the-Deck, "Son, can you tell me the difference between a good officer and a poor one?" He listened to the Ensign's response and then replied, "The difference between a good officer and a poor one is about ten seconds."<sup>7</sup> Burke knew the importance of always being prepared and acting quickly and decisively.

Burke worked out a doctrine for destroyer employment which was based on three precepts. A policy of immediate destroyer attack consisted, in Burke's paper, of destroyers always ready to attack, freedom to attack at the destroyer commander's discretion, and the import of trust by the task force commander in the destroyer commander to attack and retire without revealing the cruisers' positions.<sup>8</sup>

In July 1943, Burke was given command of a destroyer squadron at which time he trained his commanding officers (CO) in the tactics he developed from his studies of the Punic Wars. He described how he got the idea to his biographer, E. B. Potter:

The tactics of Scipio Africanus particularly interested me

as being sound, simple of execution, and adaptable to naval employment. The plan was based on hitting the enemy with one sudden surprise after another. This was accomplished by putting two destroyer divisions in parallel columns...of course, the Solomon Islands area was ideally suited to this type of tactic, with the many islands helping prevent radar detection of the second column.

Burke apparently had continued his studies of naval warfare which began at the Naval Academy and he was able to apply it to naval warfare against the Japanese. Burke's was known for his ability to think things through. When he briefed the new tactic to the destroyer commanders of his squadron, he answered all of their questions and it was obvious that he had anticipated every scenario they could imagine.<sup>9</sup>

The ingenuity of Burke's tactic was instrumental in turning the tables on the Japanese. Admiral Yamamoto had seen to it through exhaustive pre-war exercises that their night fighting tactics were second to none.<sup>10</sup> Burke's tactic was used successfully by Captain Moosbrugger in the Battle of Vella Gulf where six U. S. destroyers sank three out of four of the enemy's ships while their own remained unscratched.<sup>11</sup> Burke himself used it with similar results in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November of 1943.<sup>12</sup>

Burke's communication skills were evident in his operation orders to his commanding officers. They were short, to the point

and reminded them on the first page that everything they did should be aimed at killing Japs.

Burke's reputation and the Navy's decision to assign Surface Warfare Officers as Chief of Staff (COS) to Carrier Division Commanders landed him a job with Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher. Neither Mitscher nor Burke appreciated this assignment initially. Burke commented upon receipt of his orders, "I know nothing of carriers or planes."<sup>13</sup> Later he said, "I didn't know anything about aircraft operations, so I sent for all the publications I could get on all the aircraft that they had aboard, or we'd be operating with, and I started to study." -- a Burke trademark. He studied orders, dispatches, instructions, operating manuals and reams of battle plans. He grilled his staff and the squadron COs on all of it.

Burke applied his communication skill to the building of battle plans. His earlier study showed him that battle plans were much too wordy, so he designed plans that were concise and easy to read.

Burke was a tireless worker with the impressive ability to forego sleep. He kept his vigil as his task group patrolled the Solomons at night and spent most of the day on paperwork. Somehow he was able to ignore exhaustion.<sup>14</sup> As Mitscher's COS he

began his day two hours before sunrise in order to always arrive on the bridge before the admiral arrived and he left only after the admiral had left. To avoid any surprises he directed the staff duty officer to call him whenever he called the admiral.<sup>15</sup>

Burke not only learned about carrier air power from a master, Mitscher, he discovered new ways to think. Prior to the Battle of Manila, Burke recommended the start time for the attack be based the aerologist's (now known as the meteorologist) forecast. Mitscher replied, "The hell [we will]. Keep our radars going, and as soon as we see enemy air in the air, we launch." With all his technical training, Burke had not anticipated such utility from radar.<sup>16</sup>

In Mitscher, Burke not only had worked for a man that was willing to argue eloquently for the application of naval air power in joint warfighting, but he had seen and directed its application first hand. Mitscher a vocal proponent of the aircraft carrier countered post-war claims that the atomic bomb was the reason for the surrender of Japan by saying, "When I say that carrier supremacy defeated Japan, I do not mean air power by itself won the Battle of the Pacific. We exercised our carrier supremacy as part of a balanced, integrated air-surface-ground team, in which all hands may be proud of the roles assigned them,

and the way in which their duties were discharged. This could not have been done by a separate air force, exclusively based ashore, or by one not under Navy control."<sup>17</sup>

There were a number of attempts by the Air Force to undermine the validity of naval forces after World War II. While preparing for a fleet demonstration for President Truman, Burke suspected the Air Force would attempt a mock attack against the carrier FDR and its battle group. He deployed the carriers fighters in such a way that they were able to turn the Air Force fighters away well out of attack range. All of this was witnessed by the President on radar in the carrier's Combat Information Center.

Burke's technical and tactical experience did not, however, directly prepare him for Cold War strategic planning. The only formal training in strategy he had received was through a Naval War College correspondence course in the late 1920s. Though technical and tactical competencies did not directly affect him strategically, they did combine with his strong work ethic to provide him with a sturdy foundation for developing a broad view of the role of a modern navy in national strategy.<sup>18</sup>

Burke's training for senior leadership continued when he was hand picked to serve as a member of the General Board. It was

the board's responsibility to advise on reductions. This transitional assignment was a wake-up call for Burke who realized that he had become too specialized. He devoted himself to devouring books and articles that might fill in the blanks in his knowledge of history, economic, science, politics and international relations.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to learning by extensive readings he convinced the General Board's Chairman to bring in expert briefers on topics like the United Nations and the use of atomic energy for weapons and propulsion. On his own initiative, he joined the Brookings Institution to pursue study in economics, government and international relations. This was accomplished by attending weekly lectures and discussions.<sup>20</sup>

Burke's studies made him aware that the accuracy of the Board's forecasts would be limited unless the board could predict the future environment the Navy would operate in for the next ten years. The Board grudgingly approved his idea to conduct a study on national resources and world conditions which would require the employment of naval forces. The report, the bulk of which was penned by Burke, considered the Navy's roles vis-à-vis a powerful Soviet Union during a time of shrinking defense budgets.<sup>21</sup>

Burke talked to officials throughout the government only to learn that no one was considering a systematic approach to the future such as the one he had envisioned. He anticipated in his research the second-order effect that oil revenues would have in increasing militarization in the region. Furthermore, his studies revealed to him not only the strategic aspect of oil as a resource but the importance of the Middle East especially in relation to Russia.

He concluded that demobilization and a shrinking budget made the military's position tenuous if conditions led to a confrontation with Russia in the Middle East.

Burke's paper, entitled "National Security and Naval Contributions for the Next Ten Years," was forwarded to President Truman.<sup>22</sup>

In the paper, he asserted that instead of employing carrier forces for nuclear attacks against urban-industrial targets, such forces should be focused on destroying the most significant threat to naval and sealift forces -- the Soviet submarine forces and their homebases.<sup>23</sup>

The time spent on this strategic research project (SRP) paid off. He was marked as a captain with potential for senior

leadership. More importantly, the paper impacted his thinking and helped develop his strategic vision.

Though not yet officially a senior leader, as a Captain, Burke influenced the future of not only the Navy but of the Department of Defense when he was assigned to Op-23. It was in this advisory capacity that he provided the Navy's senior leaders with his assessment of the process that led to the National Security Act Amendments of 1949.<sup>24</sup> The controversy associated with this process came to be known as the Revolt of the Admirals and Burke was right in the thick of it. The Secretary of the Navy tried to block Burke's selection for flag because of it and Burke himself was sure it would prevent him from rising to CNO.<sup>25</sup>

Upon promotion to Rear Admiral, further opportunities to round out Burke's training for senior leadership continued overseas. He commenced the planning for rebuilding the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force and gained an appreciation for developing allies to counter the military might of the Soviet Union. Serving as a delegate to the UN truce talks with the Chinese and North Koreans convinced him that "the only thing the Communists pay any attention to is power." He also was certain that a strategy to fight and win limited war in the peripheral

Eurasian states had become just as important as nuclear deterrence.<sup>26</sup>

Burke's final assignment prior to selection as CNO was in OPNAV's Strategic Plans Division. Though many of his predecessors had not been able keep up with the paperwork load, Burke excelled and kept up a steady stream of point papers for JCS, OSD, NSC and Naval Force Commanders. His efforts resulted in a plan for determining aircraft carrier force levels in a prolonged Cold War, options for naval war with the Soviets, a long range strategic estimate for use in naval strategic and operational planning which defined the US's biggest security challenge as confrontations with the USSR not all-out war, and a critique of Eisenhower's developing policy of massive retaliation.<sup>27</sup>

#### ***IV. Visioning Opportunities as CNO***

Admiral Robert B. Carney, CNO, had been grooming Burke to eventually become a CNO. Though sooner than Carney expected, the Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas chose Rear Admiral Burke ahead of several more senior candidates to replace Carney. Burke had earned the respect of aviators and surface warriors as well as the technological establishment. His name was found on the list of every flag officer whom Thomas had polled for CNO

candidates. According to a biographer, Thomas was looking for "a vigorous, younger officer with a strong technical background and outstanding leadership skills to reenergize what he saw as a demoralized navy."<sup>28</sup> A Navy that, Thomas felt, was without vision.

Having seen CNOs come and go, Burke felt that completing two years as CNO would be a major accomplishment<sup>29</sup>, but as it turned out his tour lasted three terms (almost six years) as CNO. During this time he made numerous influential decisions and recommendations. Right off the bat, he used his untested influence to convince Secretary Thomas and President Eisenhower to change their already announced decision to stop the draft which helped the Navy meet its manpower goals. Eisenhower was not keen on the idea of changing his policy, but he granted Burke's request. Over time, however, Burke became one of Eisenhower's most trusted advisors and personal friends.

Burke pushed for nuclear powered aircraft carriers and surface combatants, started the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile program and altered submarine construction to build only nuclear powered subs. He doggedly pursued technological advancements: surface-to-air (SAM), air-to-air (AAM) and air-to-surface missiles (ASM), F-4 Phantom, A-6 Intruder and A-5 Vigilante and

computerized command and control via the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS). Because he foresaw the need to be able to attack Soviet subs in secluded havens, he placed ASW atop his list of priorities followed closely by nuclear weaponry and propulsion. This is consistent with the naval strategy he expressed in his paper for the General Board.<sup>30</sup> ASW expansion included fixed passive sonar (SOSUS) expansion, nuclear depth charges (ASROC), and maritime patrol aviation. Nuclear capabilities included nuclear capable SAMs and the nuclear delivery capability of the A-5 and A-3 Sky Warrior.

The foregoing advance in technology was accomplished despite the hot competition for defense dollars from the other services. During this period the Air Force garnered fifty percent of the defense budget followed by the Navy. Burke typically found himself opposed to the approach chosen by the Air Force and the administration regarding prosecution of general war with the Soviets and the procurement program used to support it. Philosophy had shifted from a belief in protracted war lasting months or years to a quick two stage conflict commencing with massive nuclear warfare.

Burke adamantly argued that the nuclear arena would more likely lead to a stalemate rather than to war with the Soviets.

He said, "Not even a mad Russian would think of starting a nuclear war unless he has some chance of profit...The USSR would have nothing to gain...The ultimate solution to the Communist problem [will] come from international strains and tensions which will so change the USSR, evolutionary or revolutionary, that it will cease to be an international threat." He believed in a "deterrent force so carefully dispersed yet strategically concentrated that initiation of war will be Russia's suicide." He advised, "What's more apt to occur are local wars which both the Free World and the USSR will take great pains to prevent expanding into general war...It will mean the quick positive delivery of sufficient force but not in excess. It will mean accepting something less than unconditional surrender."<sup>31</sup> None of these opinions was shared by the other members of the JCS. All of these opinions became reality in the geopolitics of the future.

Burke was certain that the Navy was central to meeting both strategic challenges. He asserted that nuclear forces at sea would be more survivable than land-based missiles and bombers. His sea-based force would be a more effective deterrent because it would survive. A strategy built on his foundation would liberate US policy from an all or nothing immediate response

approach to nuclear warfare. Burke called his strategy "finite deterrence, controlled retaliation" and was based on his well-thought out positions as a strategic planner -- the basis of his most crucial decisions as CNO.<sup>32</sup>

Burke believed so strongly in finite deterrence that within just sixty days as CNO, he began moving forcefully to implement the NSC's tasking to develop a sea-based nuclear missile force. Burke's top advisors argued against it due to technical and cost considerations. Burke's confidence in the Navy's technological abilities to overcome the obstacles led him to set up a joint project with the Army to develop a liquid-fueled missile. He quickly followed that initiative by having his planners develop a minimal target list that would effectively deter the Soviets. The arrival of solid rocket fuel and lighter warheads lead the Navy to go solo on its missile venture and the Polaris system was initiated. Burke also broke with tradition by touting Polaris for use against national targets rather than the naval targets that had pre-occupied the navy. In 1958, Burke released a paper which contained his vision for the 1970s -- a deterrence force of forty fleet ballistic missile subs and a limited conflict force of 15 aircraft carriers.

In 1959, the two approaches to nuclear war were crystallized. A large first strike aimed at Soviet civilian and military targets was counterposed by a nuclear retaliation list of high priority targets only. The approach endorsed by Burke was not to be that chosen by the decision makers, but submarine launched missiles, thanks to his foresight, did and continue to fulfill significant role in nuclear deterrence.

In order to fund the Polaris program, Burke canceled plans for cruise missile development and a jet seaplane. He also initiated a recapitalization program to compensate for the shift from surface combatant to submarine construction. He would not be deterred from expanding the national military strategy in order to maintain the Navy's status quo.

Burke was the last CNO that was actually in charge of operations. It was during his watch that legislation changed the CNO's duties to be that of a Chief of Staff though the title of Chief of Naval Operations remained unchanged. Burke, of course, resisted this change because as he said, "We believe in command, not staff." As Rosenberg says, "Because of this, the service had evolved a system of decision making more consciously decentralized than might have been workable in the other

services. Many of Burke's initiatives as CNO were intended to encourage preservation of this leadership tradition."<sup>33</sup>

In order to communicate his vision right from the start as CNO, Burke composed a classified, monthly letter called "Flag Officers Dope" to communicate events and proposals and his rational for his decisions and policies. Using the term dope would not pass muster but the concept is used today by General Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army in his "While Running" newsletter.

Burke directed the development of a multi-media presentation called "Spirit of the Navy" which was used to educate naval members in the foundations of the Navy and its role in US history. He was supportive of classic television shows like "Navy Log," "Silent Service," and "Men of Annapolis." Recognizing the need for well-rounded, educated naval officers, he established a scholarship program for academy graduates to complete their doctorates.

Burke said that a leader has to "create a sense of common purpose, without stifling individual drive and initiative." He was all for a certain degree of parochialism within naval communities, but he also insisted that it be in the context of making the Navy better as a whole. He also said that "by the

time a man makes Flag Officer he should lose his designation...and become a Flag Officer in the broadest sense of the term -- one who can command forces."

According to Rosenberg, "Burke was very much aware that he could not just command things to happen in Washington. he had to exercise leadership, not just authority. The key to such leadership was loyalty, communication and the delegation of responsibility." Burke said, "It is not wise for me to give a direct order. If I do, then I must do my damnedest to make sure that it is carried out...What I try to do is to call the action officers up to my office. This causes some complications right away because I bypass people. The action officer is supposed to tell his people what has happened and tell them what I think should be done. If the action officer is alert and enthusiastic and also believes that it should be done, it will get done, because he will follow through and he will do the checking.

[Emphasis in the original.]" This was why he said he could "influence things but I must get things done by persuasion and sometimes things do not get done which I think should be done."

Burke motivated his staff through being an example -- an example of hard work, devotion to the Navy, and sharing credit willingly and generously for anything that was successful. He

had mastered memoranda writing and used them to encourage subordinates through the use of good humor and insightful comments.

Part of Burke's vision was to strengthen ties with allied navies. He established the Naval Command College as part of the Naval War College. It included senior officers from our allies in the study of sea power.

Towards the end of Burke's third term, he became disillusioned to some degree over the Bay of Pigs fiasco which he had opposed and the failure of the president and congress to support the Laotian government in its struggle against communism. Though Kennedy offered to appoint Burke to a fourth term, he declined and completed his tour in frustration. Later, he said, "I felt there was nothing I could accomplish. I was spinning my wheels. I would submit recommendations. I would explain and explain and explain and nothing would happen. And what the hell, I could go out and grow roses or sugar cane or sit on the front porch, and at least I could watch the sun come up in the morning under pleasant circumstances. But of that job was nothing I wanted to continue."<sup>34</sup>

## ***V. Burke's Vision Skills Compared to the Model***

The purpose of this section is to compare the definition of strategic vision and Burke's actions in order to determine whether it satisfies the thesis.

Therefore, this section will consider each of thirteen questions which evaluate the validity of the thesis.

### *1. Did Burke imagine a preferred future and can it be described?*

Yes. The two most significant influences on Burke's vision were the paper he prepared for the General Board and Secretary Thomas's description of the kind of CNO the Navy needed in 1953. Whether Burke's vision just happened to match Thomas's in many respects or if Burke conformed himself to Thomas's vision is hard to determine, but it is probably a little of both. His imaginings of a preferred future lead him to prepare for it just as intensely as he had for night fighting against the Japanese.

Burke was just as driven to be ready as he was disappointed in hesitating to fire torpedoes in the Solomon Islands.

Burke's preparation showed him that oil was crucial to the success of the U.S. in his imagined future. Access to it would need to be protected by the Navy and strategic lift would be needed to defend it at its source. The threat would come from the Soviet military whose strength was in its submarine forces.

In order to counter the Soviet military he imagined a Navy that could counter the Soviet's strength, protect the US's access to oil and deter the Soviet's nuclear forces from playing a role in future conflicts.

In order to meet the challenges of the future, Burke agreed with Secretary Thomas that the Navy would have to be technological innovators and proud of their traditions. His vision included a manpower force that held the Navy in the same high regard which he had for it.

- 2. What did Burke do to create the preferred future?*
- 3. Did Burke adapt the organization for a future environment?*

Yes. Though not supported by the rest of the Navy's senior leadership in uniform, Burke forged ahead with the Polaris program. He was not intimidated by the technological obstacles involved with launching ballistic missiles from sea and moved the Navy into the realms of nuclear deterrence earlier than anyone anticipated. He not only championed the Polaris but he showed he knew how best to use it when he directed planning for its use against national targets.

- 4. Did Burke articulate the desired endstate and did he influence his followers?*

Yes. Burke described in his own words how he would meet with action officers to guide the organization towards his

vision. He was also known for his skillful memo writing. He said he believed in "command not staff" so he relied on the initiative of his subordinates, but he instilled in them the desire to accomplish his goals. The "Flag Dope" memorandums were his primary means for communicating his vision and goals.

*5. How well did Burke lead his organization in achieving the desired endstate in terms of preparedness?*

Effectively. Being prepared was the one internal force that stands out as preeminent in Burke's list of qualities. HE prepared so that he would be ready for what he envisioned would happen in each of his jobs. The willingness to risk a relationship with President Eisenhower over the draft issue which everyone thought was a done deal shows how important preparedness was to Burke. The technological developments during his time as CNO were quite likely driven by a desire to be out in front.

*6. Was Burke committed to his vision?*

Yes. It is hard to imagine someone more committed than Burke. He worked long hours and created new projects daily. He went after his goals. He shaped the Navy during the 1950s and prepared it for the rest of the cold war. Most telling of all was his approach to JCS discussions about how to prepare for war

with the Soviet Union. He fought hard for his vision of future warfare.

*7. How well did Burke envision his organization?*

Effectively. Burke, based on his training in naval tradition at the Naval Academy and wartime experience, saw the Navy's role very clearly. He wanted the Navy to have a meaningful role and he wanted it to be able to perform its role.

*8. Was Burke focused?*

*9. Did Burke set priorities?*

*10. Was the vision the right scope?*

Yes. Burke's decision to slow surface ship construction and turn instead to recapitalization of the fleet so that he could fund the build up of the Polaris program is evidence of his ability to set priorities. Without his priorities the Polaris program would have been delayed five or more years. His plan for finite deterrence extended his ability to prioritize to a conservation of national resources. Evidence for setting the right scope was his break from the tradition of employing forces to target naval targets. His vision allowed naval missiles to be targeted against national targets.

*11. Did Burke's vision reflect values worthy of the leader and his organization?*

Yes. Burke's multi-media presentation, "Spirit of the Navy," reveals the desire he had to hark back to the

organizations values. He was devoted to the Navy and put all of his energy into serving it. He understood the parochialism within the organization and did what he could to guide it so that it better the Navy as a whole. His desire to build a Navy ready to serve in a changing world with an expanded role is most worthy.

*12. Did Burke spend time and energy developing his vision?*

Yes. Burke's experience on the General Board is the evidence of how he spent his time and energy. Sticking with the theme of preparedness, he approached his research from the aspect of what would the future environment be and how would the Navy have to prepare for it. His approach mimics that described by Counds, "The visionary sucks up input like the whale sucks up krill." He joined the Brookings Institute; he studied in fields such as economics and political science; and he interviewed experts throughout the government in preparing his paper for the general board.

***VI. Conclusion***

The weight of evidence -- all answers in section V -- is in the affirmative. Arleigh Burke was indeed a man of extraordinary strategic vision. It is noteworthy as mentioned by one of his contemporaries that he worked hard at every assignment. His

fundamentals were strong and he continually returned to his naval training roots. He maintained his focus on self-improvement through reading and querying those around who were in the know. He had the information he needed to develop his vision both by knowledge acquired through study and by experience. Just as importantly he developed the leadership and communication skills required to make his vision a strategic vision.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> U. S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management (DCLM), AY97 Lesson Book 1-9, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Glenda Y. Nogami, What is This Thing Called Strategic Vision? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College., 1992), 2.

<sup>3</sup> David Alan Rosenberg, "Officer Development in the Interwar Navy: Arleigh Burke -- The Making of a Naval Professional, 1919-1940." Pacific Historical Review 44, no. 4 (November, 1975): 526.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Doug Mears, "Book Reviews: Admiral Arleigh Burke: A Biography," National Defense 76, no. 473 (December 1991): 68-69.

<sup>6</sup> E. B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random House, 1990), 72.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>10</sup> Edwin P. Hoyt, Three Military Leaders (Tokyo: Kodansha, International, 1993), 103.

<sup>11</sup> Potter, 84.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 187.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>19</sup> Potter, 297.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 297.

<sup>21</sup> James Bradford, ed., Quarterdeck, Bridge and Pentagon: Two Centuries of American Naval Leadership (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 6.

<sup>22</sup> Potter, 297, 299, 301.

<sup>23</sup> Robert William Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980) 271.

<sup>24</sup> Bradford, 7.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>29</sup> Love, 264.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>31</sup> Bradford, 9.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>34</sup> Love, 317.

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